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Comments

I

Refining the Vote: Suggested Amendments
to the Help America Vote Act's Provisional
Balloting Standards
Gerald M.Feige*
I.

Introduction

"The lesson of the 2004 election is that we still haven't fixed our
democracy." 1 The election of 2004 was the first federal election
conducted under the guidelines set forth in the Help America Vote Act of
2002 (HAVA). 2 Immediately after the election, the calls for HAVA's
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2006; B.A. History, summa cum laude, Gannon University, 2001. The author
wishes to thank Tammy Moy for her ideas, support and encouragement throughout the
comment writing process. The author also wishes to thank his family for their love and
support.
1. See Spencer Overton, Democracy Needs Fixing, Bush Should Push Election
Reforms, NEWSDAY (New York, Nassau and Suffolk edition), Nov. 8, 2004, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Individual Publication File. Spencer Overton, law professor at
George Washington University, lamented that while the Help America Vote Act has
solved some of the problems of the 2000 election by providing for provisional ballots,
there still exist several problems, as evidenced by problems in the 2004 elections, such as
insufficient polling staffs and the ability for some to "manipulate registration
requirements."
2. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 15301-545 (West Supp. 2004).
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improvement began.
HAVA's enactment was a positive step in election administration.
It marked the first time the federal government made a financial
commitment to assist states in managing federal elections. 4
Its
provisions call for improvements in election technology and 5demand that
states meet certain minimum standards of election protection.
This comment suggests changes to HAVA's standards for
provisional balloting. A provisional ballot is a paper ballot given to
voters who do not appear on registration rolls.6 Provisional ballots are
intended to ensure that voters are not turned away from the polls without
casting a ballot. 7 Part II of this comment discusses the voter registration
problems that resulted in HAVA's nationalization of provisional ballot
use, how states have handled provisional ballots, and how problems with
the 2004 election illustrate the need for change in HAVA's provisional
ballot measures.
This comment suggests reforms to HAVA's provisional balloting
standards that strengthen voters' rights without great costs. Part III
recommends a reform to HAVA's ballot counting standards, arguing that
provisional ballots should be counted partially if cast outside the voter's
precinct, as this would offer necessary protection to voters without
spawning significant drawbacks for election administration. Part IV
proposes a reform to HAVA's provisional ballot notice standards,
arguing that they are insufficient, and suggests that states be compelled
to notify by mail those provisional voters whose ballots were rejected.

3. See, e.g., Stanford, Staff, Reforming Elections, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL,
Nov. 14, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library, Individual Publication File; Robert
Landauer, Root Reforms Needed for 2008 Vote; THE OREGONIAN (Portland), Nov. 13,
2004, available at LEXIS, News Library, Individual Publication File.
4. See Trevor Potter & Marianne Holt Viray, Federal Election Authority:
Jurisdiction and Mandates, in RETHINKING THE VOTE: POLITICS AND PROSPECTS OF

AMERICAN ELECTION REFORM 113 (Ann N. Crigler et al. eds., 2004).

5. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 15481-83 (West Supp. 2004).
6. 148 CONG. REC. S1O, 488 (2002) (statement of Sen. Bond) ("The provisional
ballot will be extended to those who arrive at the polls to find that their name does not
appear on the register of voters.").
7. 148 CONG. REC. SlO, 496 (2002) (statement of Sen. Durbin) ("[HAVA] provides
a fail-safe mechanism for voting on election day. It requires that all states allow voters to
cast a provisional ballot at their chosen polling place if the voter's name isn't on the list
of eligible voters, or an election official, for whatever reason, declares a voter
ineligible.").
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REFINING THE VOTE

Background
The LandscapeBefore HA VA

The call for the nationalization of provisional ballot use came after
the presidential election of 2000. Many voters were refused ballots; the
Census Bureau estimates that over one million registered voters did not
cast votes in the 2000 election because of "registration problems. ' This
issue was most pronounced in the bitterly-contested state of Florida,
where the United States Commission on Civil Rights reported that many
voters were denied access to the polls because their names did not appear
on registration lists at their polling sites. 9 This problem led many
election administration officials and voting rights groups to call for
action to nationalize the use of provisional balloting.'0
B.

The Solution HA VA Provided

HAVA was enacted with bipartisan support."l It provided $3.86
billion in federal funds12 to improve voting technology, to improve voter
education, and to ensure that states would comply with its minimum

8. AMIE JAMISON ET AL., UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND
REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER OF 2000 10 (2002), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p20-542.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2005). The
Census Bureau's survey indicates that out of 19 million registered voters who did not
vote in 2000, 6.9%, or over 1.3 million, did not vote because of registration problems. Id.
This figure includes voters who were uncertain about registration, so it is unclear how
many of those voters actually went to the polls and were turned away. Id.
9. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN
FLORIDA DURING THE 2000 ELECTION, available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/
report/main.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2005). Florida had provisions for affidavit ballot
use, but election officials had discretion as to whether to offer this remedy to a voter, and
it was not used frequently due to concerns of voter fraud. Id.
10.

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ELECTION REFORM: AN ANALYSIS

OF PROPOSALS AND THE COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING AMERICA'S
ELECTION SYSTEM 63-64 (2001), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/
usccr/documents/ElectionReformCRbrief.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2005); THE
CONSTITUTION PROJECT

FORUM

ON ELECTION

REFORM,

RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 8 (2001), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/
doc/RECOMMENDATIONS.doc. (last visited Sept. 10, 2005).
11. See H.R. 3295, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002) (enacted) (the House bill had 169 cosponsors; among those were 108 Democrats and 60 Republicans).
12. See 148 CONG. REC. S10, 488 (2002) (statement of Sen. Bond) ("[T]his bill
provides $3.9 billion in funding over the next 5 years to help States and localities
improve and update their voting systems"). See also NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
SECRETARIES OF STATE, FACT SHEET: FUNDING THE HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002

(2004), available at http://www.nass.org/Funding%20HAVA%2OFact%20Sheet.pdf (last
visited Sept. 10, 2005) (stating that the figure is $3.86 billion).
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standards on technology and voting procedures.13
To ensure that registered voters have an opportunity to cast votes,
HAVA mandates minimum state compliance standards for provisional
balloting. 14 It provides that if a voter's name does not appear in the
registration rolls of a polling place, an election official must notify the
voter that she may cast a provisional ballot.' 5 The voter must then affirm
by an affidavit that she is eligible to vote in that jurisdiction for that
election. 16 After the ballot is cast, election officials must determine if the
voter is in fact eligible to vote. 17 If the voter is eligible, her ballot will be
counted with other provisional ballots in the days following Election
Day.' 8 To determine whether her vote was counted, the voter typically
must access an internet-based or a telephone-based state system using a
certain identification number or code. 19
C. ProvisionalBallot Use During the 2004 Election
The 2004 election was the first federal election conducted under
HAVA's provisional ballot regime. 20 Even before the election was
conducted, voting rights groups, state government agencies, and political
parties fought over how states should count provisional ballots,
13. 42 U.S.C.A. § 15301(b)(1) (West Supp. 2004). "Requirements under title III"
from this subsection refers to those registration and voting requirements found after 42
U.S.C. § 15481, which include provisional balloting. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 15481-83
(West Supp. 2004).
14. States were required to comply with HAVA's provisional balloting regulations
by January 1, 2004. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 15482(d) (West Supp. 2004). On these
provisions, Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts said, "I believe this bill will enable
more people to exercise their fundamental right to vote by setting uniform, minimum
standards for Federal elections." 148 CONG. REc. S10, 497 (2002).
15. 42 U.S.C.A. § 15482(a)(1) (West Supp. 2004).
16. 42 U.S.C.A. § 15482(a)(2) (West Supp. 2004).
17. 42 U.S.C.A. § 15482(a)(3) (West Supp. 2004). States use varying methods in
verifying a voter's eligibility. The process usually involves reviewing the documentation
submitted by the voter, ascertaining whether voter registration records and pending or
unprocessed voter registrations, comparing signatures from the affidavit and the
registration document, and checking if the voter has already voted. Some states also
contact voter registration agencies to determine if an error has been made. See James
Palmer, Provisional Balloting, in INNOVATIONS IN ELECTION ADMINISTRATION, at 26
(Federal Election Commission, No. 19, 2003) [hereinafter ProvisionalBalloting].
18. Provisional ballots are not counted in unofficial Election Day tallies, and were
intended by the drafters to be "segregated from other ballots" until they were verified as
valid. 148 CONG. REc. S10, 491 (2002) (statement by Sen. Bond). State law determines
the time frame allowed for the verification and counting of provisional ballots, and the
time ranges from one day (Kentucky) to twenty-eight days (California) after Election
Day.

THE NATIONAL COALITION

ON BLACK

CIVIC PARTICIPATION,

PRIMER

ON

PROVISIONAL VOTING 4 (2004), availableat http://www.bigvote.org/provisional ballotts.
pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2005) (on file with author).
19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 15482(a)(2) (West Supp. 2004).
20. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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especially provisional ballots cast outside the casting voter's registered
precinct. 21
Because HAVA's requirements for provisional ballots represent
minimum standards, and because states were free to enact a provisional
ballot regime of their own design, 22 states differed in the manner by
which they would count provisional ballots. 23 The most critical of these
state-by-state differences is the difference among state provisions
governing
the counting of ballots cast outside a voter's registered
24
precinct.
HAVA does not intend to compel states to count provisional ballots
outside a voter's registered precinct.25 HAVA merely provides that
individuals are permitted to cast provisional ballots if they affirm that
they are registered in the jurisdiction in which they wish to vote.26
HAVA does not define "jurisdiction"; as a result, when enacting
legislation states chose between two competing definitions. One view
holds that "jurisdiction" has the same meaning it had in the National
Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA).27 For most states, the
21.
See generally BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL
OF LAW, SUMMARY OF LITIGATION CONCERNING PROVISIONAL BALLOTS IN THE 2004

ELECTION (2004), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/
hava-provisional ballots-litigation.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2004) (summarizing
provisional ballot litigation conducted during the 2004 campaign).
22. 42 U.S.C.A. § 15485 (West Supp. 2004) ("The specific choices on the methods
of complying with the requirements of this title ... shall be left to the discretion of the
State.").
23. Provisional ballots are counted according to state law. See 148 CONG. REC. S10,
491 (2002) (statement of Sen. Bond) ("It is not the intent of the authors to overturn state
laws regarding registration or state laws regarding the jurisdiction in which a ballot must
be cast to be counted.").
24. A "precinct" or "election district" is a geographic area containing one polling
place for voting. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 21-4-21(5) (Supp. 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 212-2(28) (1998). Thus, for the purposes of provisional balloting, states that require
provisional ballots to be cast in the correct precinct require the ballot to be cast at the
correct polling place. For the problems this requirement has caused, see discussion infra.
25. 148 CONG. REC. S10, 493 (2002) (statement of Sen. Bond) ("The intent is not
to... force states to let individuals vote from locations other than the precinct in which
the voter is registered.").
26. 42 U.S.C.A. § 15482(a)(2) (West Supp. 2004).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 1977gg-6(j) (2000). Under the NVRA, "registrar's jurisdiction"
is defined as:
(1) an incorporated city, town, borough, or other form of municipality;
(2) if voter registration is maintained by a county, parish, or other unit of
government that governs a larger geographic area than a municipality, the
geographic area governed by that unit of government; or
(3) if voter registration is maintained on consolidated basis for more than one
municipality or other unit of government by an office that performs all of the
functions of a voting registrar, the geographic area of the consolidated
municipalities or other geographic units.
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28
"jurisdiction" under that definition would be a county within the state,
which means that a provisional ballot cast within the casting voter's
county would be at least partially counted. 29 The opposing view holds
that state laws should define the term "jurisdiction." Thus, if state law
holds that a voter must vote in his registered precinct, a provisional ballot
cast by the voter outside her precinct will not be counted. 30 Language in
HAVA itself, 31 as well as the legislative history of HAVA, supports this
second interpretation.
Recent case law also supports the second
interpretation. 33 Because of these differing views, in the 2004 election
seventeen states counted provisional ballots if they were cast in the
correct county, and twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia
counted 34provisional ballots if they were cast in the correct voting
precinct.
35
On Election Day, over 1.6 million provisional ballots were cast.

28. The county would typically be the appropriate geographic area, as registration is
typically conducted at the county level. See Sandusky Co. Democratic Party v.
Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 574 (6th Cir. 2004).
29. These states count a provisional ballot only for those races for which the
provisional voter was eligible to vote. See, e.g., 25 PA. STAT. ANN. § 3050(a.4)(7) (West
Supp. 2005). When a voter casts a provisional ballot in the incorrect precinct, that ballot
would include necessarily include races that are not contested in the provisional voter's
home precinct, such as municipal races. Because she is not a resident of the precinct in
which she voted, she is not entitled to cast a vote in those races. Id.
30. See Sandusky County Democratic Party, 387 F.3d at 570-71 (quoting Ohio
Secretary of State, Directive 2004-33) ("Because [state law] specifically prohibits anyone
from voting ... in a precinct in which that person is not a legally qualified elector,
pollworkers ... must confirm before issuing a provisional ballot that the person ... is a
resident of the precinct ... in which the person desires to vote.").
31. 42 U.S.C.A. § 15482(a)(4) (West Supp. 2004) ("If the appropriate ... election
official ... determines that the individual is eligible under State law to vote, the
individual's provisional ballot shall be counted as a vote in that election in accordance
with State law.").
32. 148 CONG. REC. S10, 491 (2002) (statement of Sen. Bond) ("It is not the intent
of the authors to overturn State laws regarding registration or state laws regarding the
jurisdiction in which a ballot must be cast to be counted").
33. See Sandusky County Democratic Party, 387 F.3d 565. In Sandusky, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a District Court ruling and found that the HAVA
intended state law to govern the issue. Id at 576. See also Hawkins v. Blunt, No. 044177-CV-C-RED, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21512, *27-29 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 12, 2004).
These rulings suggest that courts will interpret HAVA to allow precinct limitations on
provisional balloting if doing so is consistent with state law. Id.
34. See ELECTION REFORM INFORMATION PROJECT, ELECTION PREVIEw 2004:
WHAT'S CHANGED, WHAT HASN'T AND WHY 26-56 (2004), available at
http://www.electionline.org/Portals/I/Publications/Election.preview.2004.report.final.
update.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2005) (providing information on each state). In
addition, one state (North Dakota) has no voter registration, and five other states have
Election Day registration. Id.
35. ELECTION REFORM INFORMATION PROJECT, ELECTION REFORM BRIEFING No. 10:
SOLUTION OR PROBLEM?
PROVISIONAL BALLOTS IN 2004 11 (2005), available at
http://www.electionline.org/Portals/1/Publications/ERIP 1OAprO5.pdf
[hereinafter
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Election officials rejected about one-third of those.36 As expected,37
several problems arose regarding the distribution and counting of
provisional ballots.
Errors by both voters and poll workers resulted in provisional votes
being rejected for being cast in the wrong precinct. In some areas, one
polling place housed two different precincts; some voters cast
provisional ballots in incorrect precincts simply by going to the wrong
registration table. 38 In other areas, inexperienced or over-worked poll
workers39 directed individuals to the wrong polling places, and as a result
those voters cast ballots in the wrong precinct. 40 Still other voters were
given provisional ballots for the incorrect precinct.4 1
Mishandling of absentee ballots was another notable problem. In
some counties, most notably counties in Florida, absentee ballots were
not sent to voters who had requested them or were sent to voters too late
for them to return in time to be counted.4 2 These individuals were left
ELECTION REFORM BRIEFING] (last visited Sept. 10, 2005) (reporting 1,626,160
provisional ballots were cast in forty-two states reporting as of March 2005).
36. See ELECTION REFORM BRIEFING, supra note 35 (showing that 1,097,933
provisional ballots were counted out of 1,626,160 cast, or 68%). This one-third figure
represents an average of seventeen states who reported their provisional ballot counting
rates as of December 1, 2004.
37. Ralph Neas, head of People for the American Way, stated, before the 2004
election, "[p]rovisional ballots will be to 2004 what chads were in 2000," referring to the
disputes in Florida over improperly punched butterfly ballots. See Bill Saporito et al.,
What Could Go Wrong This Time?, TIME, Nov. 1, 2004, at 36.
38. In Ohio's Hamilton County, which encompasses Cincinnati, over 400
provisional ballots were rejected for being cast in the wrong precinct due to voters
arriving at the correct building but the wrong registration table. See Michael Powell and
Peter Slevin, Several Factors Contributed to Lost Votes in Ohio, WASHINGTON POST,
Dec. 15, 2004, at A01, available at LEXIS, News Library, Major Publications File (pdf
on file with author). See also Diane Solov, System to Blame for Ballot Debacle, Focus
Shifts to FindingSolutions, CLEVELAND PLAIN-DEALER, Dec. 24, 2004, at B 1, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Individual Publications File (pdf on file with author).
39. Several states experienced problems recruiting sufficient numbers of pollworkers
for the 2004 election. See Meeting Minutes of the United States Election Assistance
Commission, Sept. 13, 2004, pp. 8-14, available at http://www.eac.gov/docs/
Meeting%20Minutes%20September/o2013%202004.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2005).
40. Amy Klein et al., Most Voting Glitches Merely Annoying, Missing Registrations
Among Top Problems, THE RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), Nov. 3, 2004, at A01,
availableat LEXIS, News Library, Individual Publications File (pdf on file with author).
41. James Dao et al., Voting Problems in Ohio Spur Callfor Overhaul, NEW YORK
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2004, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, Individual Publications
File (pdf on file with author) (offering anecdotal evidence of the distribution of incorrect
provisional ballots).
42. Anne Kornblut, Bush and Kerry In a Tight Race, as BattlegroundsHold the Key,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3, 1994, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, Individual
Publications File (reporting that thousands of absentee voters in Florida's Broward and
Palm Beach Counties claimed not to have received absentee ballots and that the ACLU
claimed replacements were not sent on time). COMMON CAUSE, REPORT FROM THE
VOTERS: A FIRST LOOK AT 2004 ELECTION DATA/COMMON CAUSE AGENDA FOR REFORM
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without the ability to cast valid votes if they lived outside their registered
precinct or county. 43
Because of the aforementioned problems, there have been calls for a
change to HAVA's provisional voting procedures since the 2004
election. Advocates of election reform desire uniformity among the
states regarding their standards for counting provisional ballots. 4
D. Possible Reforms
Uniformity among the states is an important goal in election
reform, 45 and such uniformity could be accomplished in one of two
ways.46 First, Congress could amend HAVA to define "jurisdiction,"
giving the term the meaning it held in the NVRA. 47 This would mean
that provisional ballots would be counted if cast in the correct county.48
With this option, the states would have uniform standards as to the
geographic region in which a legal provisional ballot may be cast. While
this solves the problems associated with rejecting ballots cast outside the
requisite precinct, it provides no provisional ballot access to many of
those who do not receive absentee ballots in time to cast their votes.49
The second option is to amend HAVA to compel states to count

4-5 (2004), available at http://www.commoncause.org/atf/cf/{FB3C17E2-CDD1-4DF692BE-BD4429893665}/Report to Nation2.pdf (offering anecdotal evidence of voters
requesting but not receiving absentee ballots).
43. These individuals would be forced to travel to their jurisdictions of registration
and cast in-person ballots. See Freidman v. Snipes, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1359-63 (S.D.
Fla. 2004) (paraphrasing testimony from individuals living in state who received absentee
ballots too late to submit them).
44. Most of the calls have been for a uniform rule for the counting of provisional
ballots. See, e.g., Spencer Overton, Democracy Needs Fixing:Bush Should Push Election
Reforms, NEWSDAY (New York), Nov. 8, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Individual Publications (pdf on file with author); Sioban Gorman and Peter Stone, Back
From the Abyss, NAT'L J., Nov. 4, 2004, availableat LEXIS, Individual Publications (pdf
on file with author); Talk of the Nation, (NPR radio broadcast, November 8, 2004)
available at LEXIS, News Library, Individual Publications File (transcript on file with
author) (offering comments by Chellie Pingree, President of the voting rights group
Common Cause).
45. See 148 CONG. REc. S10, 496 (statement by Sen. Hatch) ("I appreciate the intent
underlying this legislation, which is that the system must be uniform in nature across the
entire country, if it is to be successful in accomplishing the goal of election reform.").
46. Each of these changes could occur at the state level without changing HAVA
provisions; however, given the disparity among the states, this comment assumes that the
change would need to be made by Congress.
47. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
48. Partial counting of the ballot would still take place, as the voter might still not be
eligible to vote in certain municipal races. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
49. Only those absentee ballot voters who live in the same county as their
registration would have access to the provisional ballot under this regime. See supra text
accompanying notes 28-29.
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partially provisional ballots cast anywhere within that voter's state of
registration.5 ° The League of Women Voters considers this option the
best way to count provisional ballots in future elections. 5 1 This option
would create not only a uniform geographic standard for counting
provisional ballots, but it would also provide greater access to voters in
the immediate future.
III.

A.

HAVA Should Be Amended to Compel States to Count Partially
Provisional Ballots Cast Anywhere in the State
This Change Would Result in States CountingMore Votes in
Statewide Elections

In 2004, twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia rejected
provisional ballots not cast in the correct precinct.5 2 These states
rejected, on average, 38% of provisional ballots.53 Seventeen states
rejected ballots not cast in the correct "jurisdiction., 54 These states
rejected, on average, only 30% of provisional ballots.55 Thus, when a
state increases the size of the area in which a voter can cast a legal
provisional ballot, its rejection rate tends to decline. 56 If provisional
50. The state of Washington uses this practice. Election officials mail provisional
ballots cast outside the voter's precinct to the correct precinct to be counted. David
Postman and Ralph Thomas, 98 Ballots End Up Where?, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 24, 2004,
at http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com (text on file with author). Of course, only
those races for which the voter was eligible would be counted. See supra note 29 and
accompanying text. The League of Women Voters recommends that states follow this
practice.
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, HELPING AMERICA VOTE: A GUIDE To
IMPLEMENTING TiE NEW FEDERAL PROVISIONAL BALLOT REQUIREMENT 4 (2003),
available at http://www.lwv.org/join/elections/havaresources.html (last visited Sept. 10,
2005) (hereinafter LWV GUIDE).
In fact, the state of Washington mails provisional ballots cast by residents of other
states to those states in the hopes that those states will count the provisional ballots for
the presidential race. See Postman and Ralph Thomas, supra note 50 (ninety-eight
provisional ballots were sent from Washington to Alaska).
51. The League of Women Voters also believes full counting of provisional ballots
may become possible in the future. With a statewide registration system, it will become
possible for every polling place to access provisional ballots from other precincts
electronically and produce them for the provisional voter, allowing for a full count in
both statewide and municipal races. LWV GUIDE, supra note 50, at 4. For general
information about electronic transfers of election materials, see generally Ralph C.
Keikkila, The Electronic Transmission of Election Materials, in INNOVATIONS IN
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION (Federal Election Commission, No. 12, 1995).
52. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
53. See ELECTION REFORM BRIEFING, supra note 35.
54. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
55. See ELECTION REFORM BRIEFING, supra note 35.
56. However, some individual states that counted provisional ballots cast within the
correct "jurisdiction" had higher rejection rate than some individual states that counted
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ballots were counted if cast anywhere within a voter's state of
registration, the rate of rejection should decrease further.5 7
B.

This Change Would Reduce the Effects ofHuman Errors in the
Election Process

This change would provide some protection from election
administration errors, particularly those that occurred during the 2004
election.5 8 Human error is a part of the electoral process, and no amount
of legislation or regulation can rid the electoral process of some degree
of error. 5 9 While human error is always present, its sometimes
disenfranchising effect can be reduced by allowing more voters access to
a provisional ballot.
For instance, in the case of those absentee voters in Florida who
received their ballots too late to vote,6 ° those who were still living within
the state could have cast a provisional ballot. Their ballots would have,
at the very least, counted for any election contested statewide. When
statewide races are as closely contested as they were in the state of
Florida in 2004,61 this partial remedy would have been important had it
been available.
For those voters who voted at the incorrect precinct or who were
given an incorrect provisional ballot,62 the result would not have been the
complete rejection of their provisional ballot. Instead, votes cast for
presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial races would have been

ballots cast within the correct precinct. Id. For instance, Pennsylvania, a "jurisdiction"
state, rejected 51% of its provisional ballots, while Ohio, a "precinct" state, rejected only
22%. Id. This may be due to other factors, such as provisional ballots being rejected for
reasons other than the location where it was cast. See infra note 132 and accompanying
text.
57. The rate of such a decrease cannot be estimated with any certainty. There are
several reasons for rejecting a provisional ballot; casting a ballot in the incorrect precinct
or jurisdiction is just one. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
58. See discussion supra Part II.C.
59. HAVA recognizes that error, both human and machine, will continue to occur in
the electoral process; HAVA requires all voter systems to meet minimum "error rate
standards" in the counting of ballots. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1548 1(a)(5) (West Supp. 2004).
The Federal Election Commission establishes the standards. Id. HAVA also seeks to
ensure that voters have the opportunity to make corrections to their ballot if necessary.
See 148 CONG. REC. S10, 497 (2002) (statement by Sen. Kerry) ("I believe this bill will
enable more people to exercise their fundamental right to vote by ... providing voters
with a chance to check for and correct ballot errors.").
60. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
61. In the State of Florida, the United States Senate seat was decided by less than
83,000 votes. See Florida Department of State's Election Reporting System, available at
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/index.asp (last visited Sept. 11,
2005).
62. See supra text accompanying notes 38, 40-41.
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counted.63
While counting provisional ballots cast outside of jurisdictional
boundaries would not cure entirely the problems caused by human
errors, 64 it would provide a remedy for the individuals who live within
their state of registration but who cannot vote in person in their home
jurisdiction.65 In this respect, provisional ballots would serve as true
"fail-safe ballots" by providing these voters, who would be
disenfranchised by mistake, the ability to cast a vote in statewide and
federal elections.
Congress intended provisional balloting to correct errors made by
registration officials.66 Its use should be expanded to correct some of the
errors made by election officials and poll workers.
C. The Change Would Strengthen Voter Confidence in the Electoral
System
This change will improve the voters' perception of the provisional
ballot.
Nationally, election officials rejected about one-third of
provisional ballots cast in 2004.67 High rejection rates have68 caused
voters to lose confidence that their provisional ballots will count.
By encouraging confidence in this fail-safe measure by expanding
its availability, Congress can foster greater confidence in the election
process as a whole.69 Since 2000, voters have expressed a loss of
63. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
64. Those individuals living outside the state, or overseas and military voters, would
not be able to vote by provisional ballot in their state of current residence.
65. College students are a prime example of this type of voter. See Amy L. Kovac,
Judge to Hear Election Dispute; Democratic Candidate Lost by 2 Votes, HERALD NEWS
(Passaic County, NJ), Dec. 16, 2004, at E03, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Individual Publications File (pdf on file with author) (describing how in-state college
students cast provisional ballots in the wrong county).
66. 148 CONG. REc. S10, 491 (2002) (statement by. Sen. Bond) ("The intent [behind
the provisional ballot provision] is to provide protection for those who in fact registered
but do not appear on the register because of and administrative mistake or oversight.").
67. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. However, provisional ballots are
rejected for other reasons. The most common reason for rejection is a failure by the voter
to verify his identity. See, e.g., Wyoming Secretary of State, Statewide Provisional
Ballots, Wyoming Official Summary, November 2, 2004, available at
http://soswy.state.wy.us/election/2004/results/g-prov-b.pdf (last modified Feb. 23, 2004)
(hereinafter Wyoming Results).
68. Diane Solov, System to Blame for Ballot Debacle, Focus Shifts to Finding
Solutions, CLEVELAND PLAIN-DEALER, Dec. 24, 2004, at B 1, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Individual Publications File (pdf on file with author) (reporting that a provisional
voter said. "I felt dead-sure my vote wouldn't be counted.").
69. Restoring confidence in the electoral system is a major goal of reform
legislation. See 148 CONG. REc. S10, 498 (statement by Sen. McCain) ("[HAVA is]
aimed at the heart of any successful democracy: restoring the voters' trust in their
government.").
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confidence in the manner in which elections are conducted.7 ° Problems
that arose during the 2004 election have done little to restore that
confidence.7 1
Restrictive counting of provisional ballots is not the sole source of
public distrust with the electoral system, 72 and expanding the application
of provisional ballots will not cure the problem completely. Counting
more provisional ballots ensures that fewer individuals will be
More importantly, Congress, by taking action to
disenfranchised.
remedy the provisional ballot problem, can continue to counteract the
distrust of the election process, and Americans can have greater
confidence that Congress is serious about dealing with election problems.
D. PotentialProblems with this Change
Fraud
This proposed change is not without its drawbacks.
prevention is the major justification behind rules preventing provisional
70. According to a poll conducted before Election Day 2004, 43% of Americans
believed it was "likely" or "very likely" that many votes would not be counted. Forty
percent of Americans believed that the problems of the 2000 election were "mostly not
corrected" or "not corrected at all." Thirty-six percent of Americans believed that many
people would show up to vote and be told they were not eligible to vote. MARIST
COLLEGE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC OPINION, NATIONAL POLL: VOTING COUNTS BUT WILL
ALL VOTES BE COUNTED, (Oct. 26, 2004), availableat http://www.maristpoll.marist.edu/

usapolls/PZ041026.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2005).
Error plagued the election process before 2000, but because errors received so much
focus the public gained greater awareness of the problem. See 148 CONG. REc. S 10, 497
(2002) (statement by Sen. Kennedy) ("The 2000 election taught the entire nation a
valuable lesson. We learned that every vote does matter-but that every vote is not
always counted.").
This lack of confidence shown by the Marist College poll may be based on a false
perception, however. Most Americans feel their votes will be counted. See CHRISTOPHER
N. LAWRENCE, MILLSAPS COLLEGE 2004 ExIT POLL (2004), available at
http://home.millsaps.edu/lawrecn/exitpoll-report.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2005)
(showing that 3.2% of those polled in a mainly Democratic area were not confident that
their vote was counted fairly).
71. Problems surfaced in 2004 that drew much of the attention regarding electoral
irregularities, including long lines and voter machine malfunctions. See generally Forum
on Voting Irregularities in Ohio: Meeting of the Democrat Members of the House
Judiciary Committee, (December 8, 2004), FDCH Political Transcript, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Transcripts File.
Besides these problems, other factors likely contribute to the growing lack of
confidence. It is possible that the lack of confidence in the system itself has contributed
to the belief that widespread voting irregularities have occurred. See supra note 70 and
accompanying text. It is also likely that distrust in the electoral system has increased
because of the outcome of the election itself. See generally Susan Banducci and Jeffrey
Karp, How Elections Change the Way Citizens View the PoliticalSystem: Campaigns,
Media Effects and ElectoralOutcomes in Comparative Perspective, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI.
443 (2003) (indicating that election losers become less satisfied with the political
system).
72. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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votes cast outside a precinct or a jurisdiction from being counted.73 By
rejecting ballots cast outside its defined jurisdiction, the state prevents
each voter from casting provisional ballots in multiple jurisdictions and
stuffing the ballot box with additional votes.74
However, it is
questionable whether these restrictions actually prevent persons from
casting multiple ballots.75 Also, there are several deterrents to multiple
voting. Multiple voting in federal elections is a felony, punishable by
fines and imprisonment.76 Also, HAVA requires every state to establish
a statewide list of registered voters by 2006, 77 and HAVA provides
funding for each state to establish its list.78 This list is to be
computerized and made available to every local election official in the
state. 79 This allows local election officials to determine whether the
voter is registered and determine if she has already voted. 80 This not
73. John Carlson, Editorial, There Are Laws on Where to Vote, So Stick to the Code,
DES MOINES REGISTER, Oct. 27, 2004, at 9S, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Individual Publication File (pdf on file with author).
Congress was evidently concerned about the threat of voter fraud as well. See 148
CONG. REC. SI0, 489 (2002) (statement by Sen. Bond). This threat of fraud may have
been a reason for deferring to state law for the counting of ballots, as states may be better
able to find solutions for their own local problems. See id. at S1O, 505-06 (statement by
Sen. Dodd).
74. See Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 24, 2004), transcript
available at LEXIS, News Library, Individual Publication File, NBC News File (pdf
transcript on file with author) (transcribing interview with Republican Party Chairman Ed
Gillespie, in which he states "Now, if somebody could go and register and vote one place,
go and cast provisional ballots in three or four other precincts, we can't count those
votes..... I'm concerned by the widespread fraud that's going on in terms of
registrations around the country.").
75. Even with restrictions on counting, individuals may still cast ballots in precincts
in which they are not registered; specifically, they would not show up on voter
registration rolls in these individual precincts, and as a result they would have the
opportunity to cast a ballot. See 42 U.S.C.A. §15482(a)(1) (West Supp. 2004) (providing
that when an individual does not appear on the local registration rolls, an election official
must inform the voter of the right to cast a provisional ballot).
With or without these restrictions, the ballots would be rejected-for voting in the
wrong precinct in the former and for voting more than once in the latter. See infra note
81-82 and accompanying text.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(e)(1) (2000): "Whoever votes more than once in an
election.., shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both."
HAVA made it a crime to conspire to commit vote fraud as well. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 15544 (West Supp. 2004).
77. 42 U.S.C.A. § 15483(a) (West Supp. 2004) (mandating statewide computerized
lists); 42 U.S.C. § 15483(d) (Supp. 2004) (giving states until January 1, 2006 to comply).
78. 148 CONG. REC. S10, 489 (2002) (statement of Sen. Bond); CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: H.R. 3295, HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2001 (Nov.
30, 2001), available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfi?index=3208&sequence=0 (last
visited Sept. 10, 2005) [hereinafter CBO ESTIMATE].
79. 42 U.S.C.A. § 15483(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2004).
80. These local election officials (not poll workers or other volunteers) have the duty
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only makes casting multiple provisional ballots more difficult, but it also
makes identifying multiple voters easier. 81 The prevention
of fraud is not
82
a compelling reason to avoid this proposed change.
A second argument against counting provisional ballots cast outside
the voter's precinct or jurisdiction is that allowing this practice would
discourage local voting by absentee ballot.8 3 If provisional ballots were
counted outside a precinct or jurisdiction, voters who typically voted
absentee would vote provisionally instead, and would, by doing so, forgo
voting in the elections taking place in their registered precincts.84 Voter
turnout rates suggest that large numbers of voters are not interested in
participating in local elections; there is a great difference in turnout rates
between local off-year elections and federal elections. 85 Furthermore,
of determining the voter's status after the ballot is cast. 42 U.S.C.A. § 15482(a)(4) (West
Supp. 2005); 148 CONG. REc. S10, 489 (statement of Sen. Bond). This would not prevent
an individual from filling out several provisional ballots around his state, but the local
official would have an easier time rejecting improper ballots from the statewide list,
rather than having to check several county registration lists or contacting other local
election officials. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
81. These statewide computerized lists are what make this proposed reform possible.
Without it, fraud could indeed be rampant if provisional ballots were counted statewide.
For this reason, one voting rights advocate stated that with the arrival of these lists, there
is no longer a compelling reason to refuse to count provisional ballots cast anywhere in
the voters' registered states. Gabrielle Crist, Unregistered Voters Tallied; of Provisional
Ballots Rejected, 55% Didn't Show Up on Records, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver),
Nov. 19, 2004, at 6A, availableat LEXIS, News Library, Individual Publication File (pdf
on file with author) (paraphrasing quote by Pete Maysmith, executive director of
Colorado Common Cause).
82. With the arrival of statewide registration lists, one could make the case that
voters do not need to be given the opportunity to vote provisionally in precincts in which
they are not registered. See 148 CONG. REc. S10, 491 (2002) (statement by Sen. Bond)
("If it is determined by the poll workers that the voter is registered but has been assigned
to a different polling place, it is the intent of the authors of this bill that the poll worker
can direct the voter to the correct polling place."). See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 115.430
(Supp. 2004) (authorizing election officals to direct voters to the correct polling place if
that place is determined). The statewide computerized list would allow poll workers to
determine the correct precinct of each voter and to direct that voter there. See supra note
81. However, redirecting the voter to the correct polling place may not be a viable
solution, as those who vote on Election Day evening may not be able to travel to the
correct precinct in time to cast a vote. See supra note 42-43 and accompanying text.
83. One court found that states do have an interest in ensuring that individuals have
the opportunity to cast legal votes in as many races as possible and that candidates for
municipal elections have an interest in maximizing the number of legal votes cast in
municipal races. See Hawkins v. Blunt, No. 04-4177-CV-C-RED, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21512, *21-22 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 12, 2004).
84. An absentee ballot would list all races in the precinct in which the voter is
eligible to vote. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-15-320 (Supp. 2004). A provisional ballot
cast elsewhere would not necessarily include all the races that the absentee ballot would.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
85. Using Ohio as an example, between 1990 and 2004 turnout rates for odd-year
elections ranged between 34% and 50% of registered voters. See Ohio Secretary of State,
Election History: 1940-Present, available at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/
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local and federal congressional races usually record lower total votes
than do statewide races. 86 This finding either suggests that there is a
segment of the voting public that turns out only to cast votes in statewide
races, or it suggests that some voters would be satisfied in casting votes
only for statewide elections. In addition, certain voters neglect to change
their registration address upon moving, 87 and voters may not wish to
request absentee ballots.8 8 Counting provisional ballots cast anywhere in
the state could indeed discourage the use of absentee ballots.
Even if provisional ballot use grows, absentee ballot use should still
Absentee ballot use has advantages for election
be encouraged.
administrators. The primary advantage is that absentee ballots are
typically counted on Election Day and included in precinct totals. 89 If
voters came to prefer provisional ballot use to absentee ballot use, the
subsequent increase in ballots not counted on Election Day would delay
the outcome of elections. 90
ElectionsVoter/electionResults.aspx (last visited Sept. 4, 2005). In mid-term elections,
turnout ranged between 48% and 62%. Id. In Presidential elections, turnout ranged from
64% to 78%. Id.
86. In Ohio, 5,627,903 votes were cast for President in 2004, while 5,183,506 total
votes were cast in the state's eighteen congressional races. See Ohio Secretary of State,
2004 Official Election Results, available at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/
ElectionsVoter/Results2004.aspx (last visited Sept. 10, 2005) [hereinafter 2004 Ohio
Results]. Sixteen of the eighteen districts were contested by both major parties. Id. Ohio
did not count provisional ballots cast outside the registrant's precinct; no provisional
ballots were partially counted. See Sandusky Co. Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387
F.3d 565, 574-76 (6th Cir. 2004). For a nationwide comparison from 2002, see Jeff
Trandahl, Recapitulation of Votes Cast for United States Representatives: Election of
November 5, 2002, (May 2003), available at http://clerk.house.gov/members/
electionlnfo/2002/Table.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2005) (providing a compilation of
returns from Senatorial and Congressional elections).
87. Congress recognized that our society is increasingly mobile and that voters do
neglect to change their registration addresses. 148 CONG. REC. S10, 509 (2002). Senator
Dodd of Connecticut stated that:
In a highly mobile society likes ours, voters move constantly. And while voters
may remember to change their mailing address with the post office, with utility
companies, and with the bank and credit card companies, they may not even
think about changing their address with the local election official until it comes
time to vote. At the end of the day, this conference report ensures that mobile
voters are not disenfranchised.
Id.
88. Absentee voters must request an absentee ballot form. See, e.g., N.Y. ELEC. LAW
§ 8-400(2) (McKinney 1998).
89. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-10-10 (1995) (providing that absentee ballots must be
counted as if the voter had voted in person); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 15273 (Deering 1995)
(absentee ballot count may begin the day before Election Day); IOWA CODE § 53.23(3)
(1998) (providing that absentee count is to be completed on night of election); N.Y.
ELEC. LAW § 3-408 (McKinney 1998) (providing that absentee ballot count to begin at
close of polls); 25 PA. STAT. ANN. § 3146.8(a) (West 1994) (providing that absentee
count is to be included in returns of precinct).
90. One of the arguments against expanding the use of the provisional ballot is that
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It is unlikely, however, that voters will prefer provisional ballot use
to absentee ballot use. One of the principal reasons why voters wish to
vote absentee is to avoid having to vote in person on Election Day. 91
Voters are increasingly likely to vote early and avoid the hassles of inperson voting.92 Another reason is that casting a provisional ballot can
be inconvenient. The entire process can take a long time, 93 and it results
in only part of the provisional ballot being counted. With the relative
convenience afforded by absentee ballot use as compared to provisional
ballot use, it is unlikely that large numbers of voters would choose
instead to cast provisional ballots. More importantly, when some voters
cannot cast a legal ballot in any race, it should not be a compelling
argument that other voters may abuse a less restrictive provisional ballot
regime.
A third argument that could be raised against counting provisional
ballots cast outside a jurisdiction is that doing so would increase costs of
election administration. This change could result in an increase in
provisional ballot use, requiring more personnel to verify the voter's
status and to count the ballots.94 Also, with an increase in the number of
legal ballots, more time could be spent counting ballots that were
previously rejected. 95
While provisional ballot use could increase 96 as a result of this
doing so would decrease the likelihood that elections will be decided on Election Day.
See discussion infra.
91. See Jeffrey A. Karp and Susan A. Banducci, Absentee Voting, Mobilization, and
Participation,AM. POL. RES., Mar. 2001, at 183, 184.
92. For example, in California, absentee ballot use has grown precipitously in the
past twenty years. Absentee ballots represented 9.3% of the total ballots cast in 1984,
while they represented nearly 30% of the total ballots cast in the 2003 gubernatorial
election. CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, Historical Absentee Ballot Use in
California, available at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/hist._absentee.htm (last visited
Sept. 11, 2005).
93. To cast a provisional ballot, the voter must complete an affidavit and fill out a
paper ballot. See discussion supra Part II.B. Also, before this process occurs, election
officials spend time searching registration records. Id. The affidavit requires the voter to
complete a form with personal information. See ProvisionalBalloting, supra note 17, at
app. B (displaying a variety of affidavit forms used by selected states and counties). See
also Geoff Dutton, Franklin County Voting: Suburbs Were Busiest, Even With More
Machines, COLUMBUS (OHIO) DISPATCH, Nov. 5, 2004, at 01A, available at LEXIS,
News Library, Individual Publication File (pdf on file with author) (indicating that a poll
observer in Ohio stated that it takes "twice as long" to cast a provisional ballot than to
vote in person by machine).
94. See discussion supra Part It.B.
95. See discussion supra Part ll.B.
96. As 2004 was the first year provisional ballots were used on a nationwide basis,
one can only speculate as to whether provisional ballot use will increase or decrease in
subsequent elections or what effect election technology and other factors will have on
provisional ballot use. The effect may not be known until the next presidential election in
2008, because the midterm elections in 2006 could see a decrease in provisional ballot
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reform, several factors should decrease total provisional ballot use in the
future. First, statewide registration lists available at polling sites would
allow election officials to direct more potential provisional ballot users to
the correct polling place.9 7 Second, several states use provisional ballot
affidavits as in-person or mail-in registrations for future elections. In
those states, voters who cast provisional ballots will then be registered in
the precinct in which they cast the provisional ballot. 98 Third, all states
are required to give notice to provisional ballot voters as to the status of
their provisional ballot, allowing diligent voters to correct any mistakes
they have made. 99 These facts suggest that any increase in provisional
ballot use induced by the counting of ballots cast outside the registered
jurisdiction should be offset by other decreases.
Moreover, counting the provisional ballots, rather than rejecting
them, will not actually involve a great increase in the time spent counting
ballots. The process for counting a provisional ballot and rejecting a
provisional ballot for being cast in the wrong jurisdiction are similar. 100
Whether an election official counts a provisional ballot or rejects it as
being cast in the wrong place, the official must employ the same
verification procedures to ascertain the voter's identity and place of
residence.' 0 ' The only additional process required for counting a valid
provisional ballot is the counting of the ballot itself. 0 2 Because the
overall number of provisional ballots cast should not increase, and
because any costs of counting additional ballots would be minimal, the
cost of the change is not a sufficient justification against amending
HAVA in this manner.
A final argument against counting the provisional ballots is that

use primarily based on lower turnout.
For instance, in Colorado, provisional ballot use nearly doubled between 2002 and
2004, but turnout nearly doubled as well. See Erin Cox and Susan Green, Provisional
Votes Faced Higher Bar, DENVER POST, Nov. 17, 2004, at A-01, available at LEXIS,
News Library, Individual Publication File (pdf on file with author) (noting that there were
27,366 provisional ballots in the 2002 election, and an estimated 51,000 provisional
ballots in 2004); Colorado Secretary of State Elections Center, available at
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/prior-election.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2005)
(remarking that turnout in the 2004 election was 89.33%, while turnout in 2002 was
49.45%).
97. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-9-301(5) (2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-418(b)
(Supp. 2002); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18A-15(h) (Supp. 2005); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN.
§ 65.056 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
99. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
100. See discussion supra Part lI.B.
101. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
102. Given that the vote would only be counted partially, the counting process
necessarily would take less time than would counting a provisional ballot in full.
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doing so would reduce the certainty of results on Election Day.1
Waiting for provisional ballots to be counted in order to determine a
winner in an election could add weeks to the election process. 10 4 This
argument assumes an increase in provisional ballot use with such
changes. Even assuming such an increase, this argument lacks strength.
First, even with large numbers of provisional ballots cast, races would
need to be closely contested in order to create the possibility that an
election outcome would be overturned by provisional ballots; indeed,
even closer than was the 2004 presidential election. 0 5 If the margin
were indeed small enough that provisional ballots could make a
difference in the outcome, it is likely that the small margin would either
trigger a state to conduct an automatic recount or result in a request for a
recount. 106 Beyond this, a desire for certainty in elections should focus
on the certainty that all ballots are counted and are counted accurately
rather than focusing an immediate result. 0 7 Immediate results 108
are a
disenfranchised.
are
voters
fewer
that
ensuring
when
sacrifice
small
When considering any proposed election reform, one must consider
the balance between protecting the rights of citizens to cast a legal vote

103. There are some who desire to have results of elections on Election Day. For
instance, Peggy Noonan, former speechwriter for Ronald Reagan, stated "1996 may be
remembered by us at the last time the American people could watch the news on election
night, find out who won, go to sleep and know in the morning who the next president is.
So this (referring to legal challenges and fraud allegations) is terrible." Hannity &
Colmes (Fox News television broadcast, Oct. 19, 2004), transcript available at LEXIS,
News Library, Individual Publication File, Fox News File (pdf on file with author).
104. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
105. Using the state of Ohio as an example, 153,539 provisional ballots were cast in
the 2004 general election. Ohio Election Data, supra note 76. After election night,
President Bush's lead in Ohio was around 136,000 votes. Yvonne Abraham, In the Wee
Hours, Kerry Team Held Tight to Ohio Possibilities, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 4, 2004, at
A35, available at LEXIS, News Library, Individual Publication File. In order for the
result to change, if all provisional ballots were counted, Senator Kerry would have
needed to win roughly 95%, or 145,000, of those ballots. In reality, the count of
provisional and other outstanding ballots reduced Bush's victory in Ohio to 118,599
votes. See 2004 Ohio Results, supra note 86.
106. Eighteen states conduct automatic recounts when the result is within a certain
margin, and forty states allow persons to petition the state for a recount. NATIONAL
CONFERENCE

OF

STATE

LEGISLATURES,

RECOuNTS,

(2004),

available

at

http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/Recounts.htm (last updated Sept. 1, 2004).
107. Nowhere has this idea of certainty of the count been displayed more vividly in
recent years than the 2004 gubernatorial election in the state of Washington. Two ballot
counts showed Republican Dino Rossi the winner; a third count turned the election to
Democrat Christine Gregiore. See Ralph Thomas, Washington Governor's Election
Certified, Showing Democrat Win, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 31, 2004, at Al, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Individual Publication File.
108. John Edwards, Democratic Candidate for Vice President, on Election Day 2004:
"We can wait one more night ... we will fight for every vote." See Jennifer Rosinski,
Edwards Offers Crowd Slim Hope, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 3, 2004, at 005, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Individual Publication File.
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and having an election run in an efficient manner.10 9 On this proposed
reform, the costs associated with expanding the use of provisional ballots
are relatively small. They are not sufficient to deny all registered voters
living within a state recourse to a provisional ballot when necessary.
The change recommended by this comment does not offer a perfect
solution to our election problems. It does not provide protection to
voters living outside their states of registration, and it does not provide
in-state voters the opportunity to cast a full and complete ballot. What
this change does provide is a measure of additional protection from voter
disenfranchisement at a very limited cost.
IV. The HAVA Should Provide Greater Standards of Notice for
Rejected Provisional Ballots
A.

This Change Would Ensure More Voters Know Whether Their
ProvisionalVote Counted

Congress intended all provisional voters to "have the right to know
whether their vote was counted" and the reason why it was not
counted.11 ° For that purpose, HAVA requires states to offer a free access
system for provisional voters that informs the voters of the status of their
12
ballots.11 The system can be either internet-based or phone-based.
HAVA also intended for states to ensure that only the voters themselves
have access to this system and that1 the
information provided by the
13
system is kept secure and confidential.
Every state had an access system in place for the 2004 election;
1 14
usually, a state chose only one of the two methods HAVA suggested.
109. See Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional
History, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1721, 1733 (2001) (discussing the Supreme Court's
identification of this balance).
110. 148 CONG. REC. S10. 496 (statement by Sen. Durbin).
111. 42 U.S.C.A. § 15482(a)(5)(B) (West Supp. 2004):
The appropriate State or local election official shall establish a free access
system (such as a toll-free telephone number or an Internet website) that any
individual who casts a provisional ballot may access to discover whether the
vote of that individual was counted, and, if the vote was not counted, the reason
that the vote was not counted.
112. Id.
113. 42 U.S.C.A. 15482(a)(5)(B) (West Supp. 2004) ("Access to information about
an individual provisional ballot shall be restricted to the individual who cast the ballot.").
114. NATIONAL ASSN. OF SECRETARIES OF STATE, PRESS RELEASE: NASS SURVEY OF
THE ELECTION COMMUNITY REGARDING PROVISIONAL BALLOTS, July 9, 2004, available at

http://www.nass.org/electioninfo/Provisional%20Ballots%20Summaryl.pdf (on file with
author) (last visited Sept. 11, 2005) [hereinafter NASS SURVEY].
Some states,
Pennsylvania being one, offer both methods to provisional voters. 25 PA. STAT. ANN.
§3050(a.4)(8) (West Supp. 2004).
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Only a few states provide a response by mail if a voter's provisional
ballot is rejected."15 These minimum standards of notice provided via
HAVA are inadequate, and HAVA should require that states notify by
first-class mail those voters whose provisional ballots were rejected.
Both an internet-based notification system and a phone-based
system present access problems for certain segments of the electorate.
Internet access is by no means universal; only two-thirds of the
population use the internet.' 16 That number decreases with age and
income." 7 Furthermore, although phone usage is nearly universal, nearly
one-quarter of low-income individuals do not have access to
telephones." I8
Certain segments of the electorate, particularly the
disadvantaged, face difficulty gaining access to either an internet-based
or a telephone-based notification system." 9 It is critical that the
disadvantaged have such access because provisional
ballot rejection rates
20
1
areas.
urban
poorer
in
higher
typically
are
The problem of access is compounded by the fact that the onus is
placed on the individual voter to access the system. 121 Although the
HAVA requires that provisional voters be informed about the free access
115. NASS SURVEY, supra note 114 (stating that six states planned to contact
provisional voters in 2004 election). For example, New York offers first-class mail
notification of rejected ballots. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-403 (McKinney Supp. 2004).
116.

PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, PEW INTERNET PROJECT DATA MEMO,

(2004), available at http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIPApril2004_Data.Memo.pdf
(on file with author) (last visited September 9, 2005).
117. The Pew Internet survey shows that while 65% of men and 61% of women use
the internet, only 17% of persons over the age of 69 are internet users, and only 41% of
individuals whose household income is lower than $30,000 are users. Id.
118. A government study cites a Census Bureau report finding that among individuals
with the lowest household incomes (less than $5,000 per year), 78.9% had telephone
access, while 94% of the general populace had access. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, FALLING THROUGH THE NET, 1 (1999), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/fttn99/partl.html#N_4_
(document on file with
author) (last visited Sept. 9, 2005).
119. The Senate considered access issues during its consideration of HAVA's
provisions requiring voter identification. See 148 CONG. REC. S 10, 489 (2002) (statement
by Senator Bond) ("The Department of Transportation statistics report that more than 90
percent of Americans of voting age have a drivers license. But to be certain no one will
be negatively impacted, the conferees included carefully crafted and balanced
identification requirements").
120. For instance, in the state of Ohio, where the overall rejection rate was 22.7%, the
rejection rates of Cuyahoga and Hamilton counties, which include Cleveland and
Cincinnati, were 33.8% and 29.5% respectively. However, the rejection rate of Franklin
County, which includes Columbus, was below the state average. 2004 Ohio Results.
supra note 86. See also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTIONS: STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS OF FACTORS THAT AFFECTED UNCOUNTED VOTES IN THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL

ELECTION 9-10, (Oct. 2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d02l22.pdf
(last visited Sept. 11, 2005) (showing that race, education, and increased voter age
contributed to higher rates of uncounted ballots of all types).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 111-113.
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system at the time of voting, 122 this does not ensure that the voter will
actually access the system on her own and determine the status of her
vote. 123 If a ballot was erroneously rejected, or wrongfully rejected, or if
a ballot could be verified by additional information supplied by
a voter,
12 4
only the voter herself has the opportunity to correct the mistake.
A system that provides written notification of a rejected ballot
through the mail would create a greater opportunity for voters to correct
the mistakes they have made in future elections. 125 It would also provide
written documentation to voters who
might later wish to challenge the
26
determination of election officials. 1
B.

The Costs of this Change

The financial cost of granting the aforementioned notification would
not be great. In the 2004 general election, over 1.6 million provisional
122. 42 U.S.C.A. § 15482(a)(5)(A) (West Supp. 2004).
123. Even diligent voters may neglect to check the status of the ballot after the races
are decided. For instance, one voter called election officials before the election after
failing to receive confirmation of her change of address. Because she was registered in a
different precinct, she was told to cast a provisional ballot at a place near her home. She
did not learn her ballot was rejected until Democratic Party officials had inspected the
provisional ballots for one of their candidates. Amy L. Kovac, Judge to Hear Election
Dispute; Democratic Candidate Lost by 2 Votes, HERALD NEWS (Passaic County, NJ),
Dec. 16, 2004, at E03, available at LEXIS, News Library, Individual Publication File
(pdf on file with author).
124. Given the provisions on confidentiality of provisional ballots listed above, one
would expect that the identity of those who cast provisional ballots would not be released
to members of the public. However, in Washington State, a judge granted a motion to
release lists of voters whose provisional ballots were rejected to Democratic Party
officials wishing to find more votes in the tight Washington state gubernatorial race. See
Susan Gilmore et al., 2004 Governor's Race: Judge Orders King County to Share
Provisional-VoterList, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 13, 2004, at Al, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Individual Publication File. Apparently, the closeness of the race, the fastapproaching election certification date, and the fact that other similar lists in the state
were released weighed in favor of the release. Id.
125. The Senate, while considering HAVA, stressed the importance of a voter being
given the opportunity to correct mistakes on her ballot. See 148 CONG. REc. S10, 488
(2002) (statement by Sen. Bond) ("We also provide specific minimum requirements for
the voting systems so that we can be assured that . . . voters are given the opportunity to
correct any errors that they have made prior to their vote being cast."); S10, 501
(statement by Senator Dodd) ("The right to look at your ballot, correct your ballot before
it is finally cast. I know these are radical ideas, but these are important provisions. No
longer will you have to leave a voting place wondering whether you might have voted
twice-two people for the same office.").
126. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 15512(a) (West Supp. 2004). HAVA mandates that states
have administrative-complaint procedures and remedy any state violation of the
provisions of the Act. Id. This allows a remedy for a wrongful failure to count a
provisional ballot, though critics of HAVA argue that HAVA should have a federal court
remedy for a state violation. See 148 CONG. REc. S10, 501 (2002) (letter from National
Council of La Raza).
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ballots were cast.127 On average, one-third of provisional ballots cast are
rejected., 28 Nevertheless, even if all of these 1.6 million ballots were
rejected, the postage cost of providing first-class mailing would have
been just over $600,000.129 Included in the funding estimates of HAVA
are rate reductions for first-class mailings from election officials to
individual voters.1 30 Thus, the cost of these mailings could be split
between the state and federal
governments, making it more affordable for
3
the states to implement.'

1

There would be additional administrative costs in providing such
notice; however, these costs can be minimized. There are finite reasons
for rejecting a provisional ballot; 32 election officials could utilize form
letters before elections that provide for each of these circumstances and
place the name of the voter on the form letter once a ballot is rejected.
Thus, election officials would not need to draft form letters for every
rejected voter. In order to send the letter, election officials could use the
address from the ballot or the accompanying affidavit. 33 States could
computerize the process for greater efficiency. Though these tasks
would require additional manpower costs, they are short in duration and
would not require a state to add permanent personnel.
These increased costs could foster savings in the future. Greater
notice ensures that fewer mistakes will be made in the future, either by
the voters or by election officials. 34 This would serve to reduce the
127. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. It is uncertain whether 2004 will
represent a "high-water mark" for the use of provisional ballots. See discussion supra
Part III.C. Several future adjustments could work to decrease the total numbers of
provisional ballots, the most important of which is the statewide registration roll that
HAVA requires of the states by 2006. Id.
128. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
129. This estimate multiplies the number of provisional ballots cast (1,626,160) by
the current first-class postage rate of $0.37.
130. CBO ESTIMATE, supra note 78. The CBO estimates provided off-budget costs to
the United States Postal Service in providing two half-rate mailings to each of the
estimated 150 million registered voters in this country. Id. These costs were expected to
be absorbed in future years by postal rate increases. Id.
13 1. Because these rate decreases would be available to states each year, they would
be available for both federal elections and off-year municipal elections. Id.
132. See Wyoming Results, supra note 67 (providing a list of rejected provisional
ballots with reasons for rejection). Only five different reasons for rejection were listed:
the voter had no identification; the voter was a felon; the voter had already voted; the
voter was not a state resident; and the voter voted in the incorrect precinct. Id. See also
Provisional Balloting, supra note 17, at app. D (reproducing examples of state
verification and counting guidelines that list reasons for rejecting provisional ballots).
133. One potential concern is that providing a mailing would compromise the
confidentiality of the provisional ballot information as well as the identity of the
provisional voter. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. However, the risk that the
voter would not know that her ballot was rejected should be considered ahead of this
possible privacy concern. See supra note 125-26 and accompanying text.
134. Voters casting a provisional ballot for the first time could still make mistakes.
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number of provisional ballots cast and would also reduce the number of
provisional ballots rejected. As ballots and rejections decrease, the costs
of providing notice and handling provisional ballots generally will
decrease.
Overall, the balance between protecting voters' rights and
promoting efficiency in election administration favors the strengthening
of the HAVA's notice provisions as suggested. Neither the financial
costs nor the administrative costs of providing notice by mail would be
great, and notice would aid in ensuring that mistakes made by individual
voters in elections are not repeated in future elections. The Help
America Vote Act should be amended to give greater aid to the
provisional voter by mandating that notice by mail be given to those
voters whose provisional ballot was rejected.
V.

Conclusion

Upon the Senate's approval of the Help America Vote Act, Senator
John McCain said, "I would urge my colleagues not to treat this
legislation as the conclusion of our work on the issue of election
reform., 135 Events from the 2004 election have shown the need for
greater protection of voting rights. America's confidence in the electoral
system has been shaken by two successive Presidential elections marred
by allegations of error and irregularity. To restore this confidence,
Congress should focus on means to ensure that registered voters are not
prevented from participating in federal elections.
To that end,
provisional ballot use should be expanded to provide greater access to
this fail-safe remedy when voters would otherwise be unable to cast a
legal vote. This change offers a low-cost way to ensure greater
enfranchisement. HAVA should be amended to allow provisional ballots
cast anywhere within a state to count as a legal vote in that state's federal
and statewide elections.
However, because some provisional ballots will still be rejected,
states should be bound to ensure that their citizens are notified as to the
reasons why individual provisional ballots have been rejected. The
HAVA recognizes this duty and mandates that the states provide a
notification system. This notification system is inadequate, as it
necessarily fails to give notice to certain segments of voters, particularly
those most prone to cast a rejected ballot. Congress should mandate that
those voters whose provisional ballots were rejected be notified by mail
of the reasons for the rejection. This written notice is far more protective
of the individual voter's rights than the current system, and it can be

135.

148 CONG. REC. SlO, 498 (2002) (statement by Senator McCain).
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implemented without great financial burden.
The Help America Vote Act laid the groundwork for the federal
government's involvement in the electoral process. Congress should
continue to work with the states to find sensible and economical
approaches to improve the way elections are conducted. The two
reforms advocated herein represent just that-common sense ways to
improve the electoral process in this country.

